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This research investigates the extent to which financial incentives (conditional cash transfers) 
would induce Americans to opt for vaccination against COVID-19. We performed a randomized 
survey experiment with a representative sample of 1,000 American adults in December 2020. 
Respondents were asked whether they would opt for vaccination under one of three incentive 
conditions ($1,000, $1,500, or $2,000 financial incentive) or a no-incentive condition. We find 
that—without coupled financial incentives—only 58% of survey respondents would elect for 
vaccination. A coupled financial incentive yields an 8-percentage-point increase in vaccine uptake 
relative to this baseline. The size of the cash transfer does not dramatically affect uptake rates. 
However, incentive responses differ dramatically by demographic group. Republicans were less 
responsive to financial incentives than the general population. For Black and Latino Americans 
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After the COVID-19 vaccines were first authorized in the United States for emergency 1 
use in the winter of 2020-2021, there was more demand than supply. Yet by spring 2021, 2 
long before reaching herd immunity, supply began to exceed demand in some areas.1   3 
Polls suggest that about 35% of Americans may resist vaccination,2 and similar levels of 4 
hesitancy are seen in Ireland and the United Kingdom.3 Even among those prioritized to 5 
receive vaccines, such as healthcare workers, widespread hesitancy to accept the 6 
vaccine has been reported.4 Such hesitancy can be a constraint on achieving herd 7 
immunity, which for COVID-19 has been estimated to require 70% or more of the 8 
population to be vaccinated.5 And the sooner the better—the delay in achieving herd 9 
immunity creates more opportunities for the virus to mutate into more resistant versions. 10 
There are several possible explanations for vaccine hesitancy. Some persons 11 
have private information about their risk-benefit profiles (e.g., a medical contraindication) 12 
or hold erroneous beliefs about safety, efficacy, or background risk.6 Other causes include 13 
psychological biases, such as regret aversion, where people avoid vaccination to avoid 14 
 
1 See e.g., Courtney Ann Jackson, COVID-19 vaccine demand slowing in Mississippi, WLBT 2021; Jeff 
Keeling, Bianca Marais, Vaccine uptake plummets in Northeast Tennessee as supply far outstrips 
demand, WJHL, 2021.  
2 Gallup. U.S. readiness to get covid-19 vaccine steadies at 65%. Gallup.com, 2021. 
3 Jamie Murphy, Frédérique Vallières, Richard P Bentall, Mark Shevlin, Orla McBride, Todd K Hartman, 
Ryan McKay, Kate Bennett, Liam Mason, Jilly Gibson-Miller, et al. Psychological characteristics associated 
with Covid-19 vaccine hesitancy and resistance in Ireland and the United Kingdom. Nature 
Communications, 12(1):1–15, 2021. 
4 Kin On Kwok, Kin-Kit Li, Wan In Wei, Arthur Tang, Samuel Yeung Shan Wong, and Shui Shan Lee. 
Influenza vaccine uptake, Covid-19 vaccination intention and vaccine hesitancy among nurses: A survey. 
International Journal of Nursing Studies, 114:103854, 2021 
5 A David Paltiel, Jason L Schwartz, Amy Zheng, and Rochelle P Walensky. Clinical outcomes of a Covid-
19 vaccine: Implementation over efficacy: Study examines how definitions and thresholds of vaccine 
efficacy, coupled with different levels of implementation effectiveness and background epidemic severity, 
translate into outcomes. Health Affairs, pages 10-1377, 2021 
6 Wändi Bruine de Bruin and Daniel Bennett. Relationships between initial Covid-19 risk perceptions and 
protective health behaviors: A national survey. American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 59(2):157-167, 
2020. 
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the feeling of regret about their vaccination decision should they experience an adverse 15 
event.7 Regret aversion is strongest when people make active choices for which they feel 16 
responsible, like taking the vaccine, rather than passive choices for which they feel other 17 
people or nature are responsible, like merely being exposed to the virus.8  18 
Vaccine hesitancy can also vary with demographic attributes. For instance, black 19 
Americans have  reasons to distrust the U.S. healthcare and medical research systems, 20 
given a history of exclusion and exploitation.9  For different reasons, Republicans 21 
reportedly distrust public health experts.10  As of this article’s publication date, the 22 
available vaccines are not Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved but rather 23 
authorized under Emergency Use Authorization (EUA). Research has found that, 24 
“concern about rushed development of the vaccine [is a] significant predictor[] of lower 25 
willingness to get a COVID-19 vaccine under EUA.”11  Some Americans may rationally 26 
adopt a “wait-and-learn” approach.12 27 
 
7 Katrina F Brown, J Simon Kroll, Michael J Hudson, Mary Ramsay, John Green, Charles A Vincent, 
Graham Fraser, and Nick Sevdalis. Omission bias and vaccine rejection by parents of healthy children: 
implications for the influenza a/h1n1 vaccination programme. Vaccine, 28(25):4181-4185, 2010. 
9 Gamble VN. A legacy of distrust: African Americans and medical research. Am J Prev Med. 1993 Nov-
Dec;9(6 Suppl):35–38.  Fairchild AL, Bayer R. Uses and abuses of Tuskegee. Science. 1999 May 
7;284(5416):919–921.  Shavers Vickie L, Lynch Charles F, Burmeister Leon F. Racial differences in 
factors that influence the willingness to participate in medical research studies. Ann Epidemiol. 2002 
May;12(4):248–256. 
9 Gamble VN. A legacy of distrust: African Americans and medical research. Am J Prev Med. 1993 Nov-
Dec;9(6 Suppl):35–38.  Fairchild AL, Bayer R. Uses and abuses of Tuskegee. Science. 1999 May 
7;284(5416):919–921.  Shavers Vickie L, Lynch Charles F, Burmeister Leon F. Racial differences in 
factors that influence the willingness to participate in medical research studies. Ann Epidemiol. 2002 
May;12(4):248–256. 
10 . Frankovic K. COVID-19 vaccine rejectors don’t trust healthcare experts – but they do trust trump | 
YouGov. https://today.yougov.com/ Web site. https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/articles-
reports/2021/03/30/who-vaccine-rejectors-dont-trust. Updated 2021. Accessed Apr 13, 2021. 
11 Guidry, Jeanine PD, Linnea I. Laestadius, Emily K. Vraga, Carrie A. Miller, Paul B. Perrin, Candace W. 
Burton, Mark Ryan, Bernard F. Fuemmeler, and Kellie E. Carlyle. "Willingness to get the COVID-19 
vaccine with and without emergency use authorization." American journal of infection control 49, no. 2 
(2021): 137-142. 
12 Daniel A. Salmon, et al., COVID-19 vaccination attitudes, values and intentions among United States 
adults prior to emergency use authorization, Vaccine, Volume 39, Issue 19, 2021, Pages 2698-2711. 
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There are several policy mechanisms available to increase vaccine uptake.  On 28 
one extreme, the Supreme Court has affirmed the constitutionality of a vaccine mandate 29 
in a classic case involving an adult who refused.13  In recent history, vaccination policy 30 
has primarily relied on state mandates for school-age children, with various exemptions 31 
and exemption procedures.14 Some healthcare employers have also mandated flu 32 
vaccinations for workers.15  In contrast to this emphasis on children and healthcare 33 
workers, the current pandemic requires broad vaccination of adults. Although 34 
governments arguably have legal power to mandate a COVID-19 vaccine, with or without 35 
religious or personal belief exemptions, such a move may be unethical or politically 36 
infeasible, especially prior to full FDA licensure of the vaccine products.16 37 
To encourage vaccination uptake while respecting choice, policymakers and 38 
economists have proposed that governments should offer financial incentives—39 
conditional cash transfers—with one prominent proposal recommending $1500 per 40 
person.17 Likewise, several businesses have reportedly begun to pay their employees to 41 
get vaccinated.18 In April 2021, one U.S. state announced that they would begin giving 42 
 
13 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
14 Neal D. Goldstein, Joanna S. Suder, and Jonathan Purtle. Trends and characteristics of proposed and 
enacted state legislation on childhood vaccination exemption, 2011–2017. American journal of public 
health 109, no. 1 (2019): 102-107. 
15 Samantha I. Pitts et al., A Systematic Review of Mandatory Influenza Vaccination in Healthcare 
Personnel, 47 Am. J. Preventative Med. 330, 336 (2014), http://vaccinesafetyresource.elsevier.com/ 
sites/default/files/Flu-Pitts-Systematic.pdf [http://perma.cc/89RF-SGLQ]. 
16 Dorit R Reiss and Arthur L Caplan. Considerations in mandating a new Covid-19 vaccine in the USA for 
children and adults. Journal of Law and the Biosciences, 7(1), 2020; Michelle M Mello, Ross D Silverman, 
and Saad B Omer. Ensuring uptake of vaccines against Sars-Cov-2. New England Journal of Medicine, 
383(14):1296-1299, 2020. 
17 John Delaney. Pay Americans to take a Coronavirus vaccine. Washington Post, 2020.  Robert Litan, 
Want Her Immunity?  Pay People to Take the Vaccine, Brookings, August 18, 2020 available at 
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/want-herd-immunity-pay-people-to-take-the-vaccine/.  Julian 
Savulescu, Good reasons to vaccinate: mandatory or payment for risk? Journal of Medical Ethics 
2021;47:78-85. 
18 Claire Miller. Trader Joe’s, Dollar General, and others are paying workers to get vaccines. NPR, 2021.  
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$100 savings bonds to adults under the age of 35 who get vaccinated (including 43 
retroactive payments for those already vaccinated).19  44 
This paper investigates the extent to which coupled financial incentives 45 
(conditional cash transfers) would induce Americans to opt for vaccination against 46 
COVID-19.  47 
Economic theory and experience predict that financial incentives would increase 48 
vaccine uptake by lowering the effective price, thus increasing the quantity demanded 49 
(i.e., the Law of Demand).20 A similar economic logic in reverse justifies the use of taxes 50 
on alcohol and cigarettes to improve public health and the use of copays and deductibles 51 
to curb low-value healthcare consumption.21 These financial disincentives decrease the 52 
perceived personal benefits of a behavior on net, and thus discourage it. Prior work has 53 
found that incentives work in a range of health contexts, from home-based health 54 
monitoring for diabetics22 and warfarin adherence23 to physical activity24 and smoking 55 
cessation.25 56 
 
19 Katie Lobosco and Kelsie Smith, West Virginia giving people under 35 $100 savings bonds for getting 
vaccinated, CNN 2021. 
20 Christopher T Robertson, K Aleks Schaefer, Daniel Scheitrum, Sergio Puig, and Keith Joiner. 
Indemnifying Precaution: Economic Insights for Regulation of a Highly Infectious Disease. Journal of Law 
and the Biosciences, 7(1):lsaa032, 2020. 
21 Alexandra Wright, Katherine E Smith, and Mark Hellowell. Policy lessons from health taxes: A systematic 
review of empirical studies. BMC Public Health, 17(1):1-14, 2017; Christopher T Robertson. Exposed: Why 
our Health Insurance Is Incomplete and What Can Be Done About It. Harvard University Press, 2019.  
22 Sen, Aditi P., Taylor B. Sewell, E. Brooks Riley, Beth Stearman, Scarlett L. Bellamy, Michelle F. Hu, 
Yuanyuan Tao et al. "Financial incentives for home-based health monitoring: a randomized controlled 
trial." Journal of general internal medicine 29, no. 5 (2014): 770-777. 
23 Stephen Kimmel, et. Al,  "Randomized trial of lottery-based incentives to improve warfarin 
adherence." American heart journal 164, no. 2 (2012): 268-274. 
24 Mitesh Patel, et al. "A randomized, controlled trial of lottery-based financial incentives to increase 
physical activity among overweight and obese adults." American Journal of Health Promotion 32, no. 7 
(2018): 1568-1575. 
25 Volpp, Kevin G., Andrea B. Troxel, Mark V. Pauly, Henry A. Glick, Andrea Puig, David A. Asch, Robert 
Galvin et al. "A randomized, controlled trial of financial incentives for smoking cessation." N Engl J Med 
360 (2009): 699-709. 
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Nevertheless, human behavior are not always  as simple as implied by traditional 57 
economic models. Violations of these models have been long reported by researchers 58 
from psychology and behavioral economics. Indeed, leading behavioral scientists have 59 
recently suggested that paying financial incentives for COVID-19 vaccinations may not 60 
only be ineffectual, but could actually backfire by reducing overall vaccine uptake.26 As 61 
Volpp, Loewenstein, and Buttenheim (2021) argue, “considerable research shows that 62 
payments in some contexts can send the signal that an action is undesirable, unpleasant, 63 
or even dangerous and not worth taking based purely on personal benefit. Financial 64 
incentives are likely to discourage vaccination (particularly among those most concerned 65 
about adverse effects)”.27 66 
Incentives could be ineffectual or backfire for multiple reasons. First, when people 67 
are motivated to get the vaccine for intrinsic motivations, like being a good citizen and 68 
contributing to the public good, an extrinsic motivation, like a cash payment, may “crowd-69 
out” the intrinsic motivations.28 The motive to be a good person may actually be stronger 70 
than the motive to earn a few bucks, and the two motives may not comfortably co-exist in 71 
a given context, like vaccination. Second, people may see the choice to accept a vaccine 72 
(putting a foreign body in their own bodies) as a “sacred value” that is unaffected by 73 
 
26 Kevin G Volpp, George Loewenstein, and Alison M Buttenheim. Behaviorally informed strategies for a 
national Covid-19 vaccine promotion program. JAMA, 325(2):125-126, 2021; Tappin, David, Linda Bauld, 
David Purves, Kathleen Boyd, Lesley Sinclair, Susan MacAskill, Jennifer McKell et al. "Financial incentives 
for smoking cessation in pregnancy: randomised controlled trial." Bmj 350 (2015). 
27 Id. 
28 Kristen Underhill. When extrinsic incentives displace intrinsic motivation: Designing legal carrots and 
sticks to confront the challenge of motivational crowding-out. Yale J. on Reg., 33:213, 2016. 
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monetary incentives.29 This concern relates to a broader problem of “commodification”, 74 
and whether everything can and should be priced.30 75 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, a payment could signal that the vaccine is 76 
extra risky, a concern which has been observed when paying human subjects to 77 
participate in research studies.31 If high prices on products signal high quality to 78 
consumers, then a high payment being offered to consume a product (a negative price) 79 
may signal larger-than-expected risks.  80 
Similar debates have played out in other public health contexts, such as the effect 81 
of paying for blood donations, where ethical theorists and lab data suggested that 82 
incentives may backfire and actually reduce donation rates.32 Nonetheless, when 83 
rigorous field studies were eventually completed, they consistently found that large 84 
positive effects of incentives on organ donation behavior.33  The perceived risks of 85 
vaccination (and of not vaccinating) may be quite different than for blood donation or other 86 
domains where incentives have been tested.   87 
There is no empirical research that speaks directly to the question of whether 88 
incentives for a COVID-19 vaccine would be effective, but there has been research on 89 
the effects of incentives for other vaccines.  A 2014 systematic review of four studies of 90 
financial incentives for parents to promote pediatric vaccinations concluded that there 91 
 
29 Julio J Elias, Nicola Lacetera, and Mario Macis. Sacred Values? The Effect of Information on Attitudes 
toward Payments for Human Organs. American Economic Review, 105(5):361-65, 2015. 
30 I Glenn Cohen. The price of everything, the value of nothing: reframing the commodification debate. 
Harvard Law Review, 117(689), 2003. 
31 Cynthia E Cryder, Alex John London, Kevin G Volpp, and George Loewenstein. Informative Inducement: 
Study Payment as a Signal of Risk. Social Science & Medicine, 70(3):455-464, 2010. 
32 See generally, Pablo Rodriguez del Pozo, Paying Donors and the Ethics of Blood Supply, Journal of 
Medical Ethics, 20: 31-35 1994. 
33 Nicola Lacetera, Mario Macis, and Robert Slonim. Economic rewards to motivate blood donations. 
Science, 340(6135):927-928, 2013.  
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was insufficient evidence to determine effectiveness.34 On the other hand, a 2019 review 92 
of interventions to encourage Hepatitis B vaccination among substance users included 93 
three randomized controlled trials testing monetary rewards, and concluded that they 94 
were the most effective interventions.35 Likewise, in a randomized field trial of human 95 
papillomavirus (HPV) vaccines in England among 17-18 year old girls, researchers found 96 
that paying the USD $73 equivalent nearly doubled the rate of uptake (22% versus 97 
12%).36 Several field experiments in developing countries have found substantial effects 98 
as well. For example, a tetanus vaccination campaign in Nigeria randomized women to 99 
receive either the equivalent of US $0.03, or $2, or $5.33 as conditional cash payments 100 
for vaccination. The higher payments caused dramatically higher uptake (55%, 76%, and 101 
86% respectively).37  102 
 103 
2. Methodology 
To assess the potential effectiveness of offering financial incentives for COVID-19 104 
vaccination, we performed a randomized survey experiment in December 2020 with a 105 
sample of 1,000 American adults (provided by Qualtrics, Provo, UT), stratified to be 106 
representative of U.S. households in terms of age, gender, income, and education. 107 
Qualtrics uses an opt-in panel (thus not allowing calculation of a response rate) and 108 
 
34 Sarah Wigham, Laura Ternent, Andrew Bryant, Shannon Robalino, Falko F Sniehotta, and Hean Adams. 
Parental financial incentives for increasing preschool vaccination uptake: systematic review. Pediatrics, 
134(4):e1117-e1128, 2014.  
35 Stacy Tressler and Ruchi Bhandari. Interventions to increase completion of Hepatitis B vaccination in 
people who inject drugs: a systematic review and meta-analysis. In Open Forum of Infectious Diseases, 
Volume 6, page ofz521. Oxford University Press US, 2019. 
36 Eleni Mantzari, Florian Vogt, and Theresa M Marteau. Financial Incentives for Increasing Uptake of HPV 
Vaccinations: A Randomized Controlled Trial. Health Psychology, 34(2):160, 2015. 
37 Sato, R. and Fintan, B., 2020. Effect of cash incentives on tetanus toxoid vaccination among rural 
Nigerian women: a randomized controlled trial. Human vaccines & immunotherapeutics, 16(5), pp.1181-
1188. 
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selects respondents to fill quotas based on national demographics.  As part of their 109 
proprietary methods, Qualtrics compensates respondents for their participation.  We 110 
secures informed consent on the survey platform. The survey and the associated 111 
protocols were approved by the IRB at the University of Delaware.  112 
We apply multivariate regression analysis to survey responses to shed light on three 113 
questions: 114 
1. Would coupled financial incentives (conditional cash transfers) induce Americans 115 
to opt for vaccination against COVID-19?  116 
2. Does the size of the conditional cash transfer affect the level of uptake? 117 
3. Do conditional cash transfers encourage uptake among the most hesitant 118 
demographic groups? 119 
 
2.1. Survey Instrument 
Survey respondents viewed, with equal probability, one of three incentive (i.e., treatment) 120 
conditions or a no-incentive (i.e., control) condition. In the no-incentive condition, we 121 
asked, “Suppose a vaccine, which has been shown to be 95% effective at preventing 122 
COVID-19 infections, has been authorized for emergency use by the U.S. Food and Drug 123 
Administration. If that vaccine was made available to you tomorrow at no cost, would you 124 
elect to receive the vaccine?” In the incentive conditions, in between those two sentences, 125 
we added: “Further, suppose that the Federal Government is providing a one-time 126 
stimulus payment of [INCENTIVE] to persons who elect to receive the vaccine,” where 127 
the financial incentive amount was set to either $1,000, $1,500, or $2,000. These values 128 
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were chosen to bracket  the $1500 value made in a prominent proposal.38   The between-129 
subjects design insured that the respondents in the control condition were blinded to the 130 
purpose of the study, and thereby provide a baseline representing the status quo of no-131 
incentive. 132 
Respondents could answer ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘unsure’. Demographic information was 133 
collected alongside the experimental questions.   134 
 
2.2. Statistical Analysis 
Based on the responses to our experimental survey, we estimate a series of multi-variate 135 
regression models. For each of these regressions, our dependent variable Vaccinei is 136 
constructed as a binary outcome, where, for a given respondent i, the outcome is equal 137 
to one if the respondent chose to receive the vaccine, and equal to zero if the respondent 138 
declined or indicated they were unsure whether they would receive the vaccine. 139 
Financial Incentives and Vaccine Uptake: To assess the extent to which coupled 140 
financial incentives (conditional cash transfers) induce Americans to opt for vaccination 141 
against COVID-19, we estimate the following model:  142 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑉𝑉𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖′𝜃𝜃 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 Eq. (1) 
where variable Vaccine is as defined above. Our variable of interest (denoted 143 
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑉𝑉𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖) is a binary variable, which distinguishes between our treatment and control 144 
groups. The variable takes value one if the respondent viewed one of the financial 145 
incentive (i.e., treatment) conditions. The variable takes value zero if the respondent 146 
viewed the no-incentive (i.e., control) condition. The coefficient on INCENTIVE (𝛽𝛽) 147 
 
38 See, supra, Delaney (2020) at fn. 9. 
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measures the responsiveness of individuals to financial incentives to vaccination. Matrix 148 
𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊 includes a series of indicator (dummy) variables to control for the demographic identity 149 
of the respondent, including age, stated gender, household income, education level, 150 
ethnicity, and preferred political party.  151 
We assess the robustness of our model by re-estimating using a probit 152 
specification. We also estimate the average treatment effects (ATE) of financial incentives 153 
using two types of “matching” models: nearest-neighbor matching39 and propensity score 154 
matching.40 As a further robustness check, the model in equation (1) relies on an indicator 155 
specification of our dependent variable in which a “yes” response is equal to one and a 156 
“no” or “unsure” response is coded as a zero. However, financial incentives could also 157 
push people into the “unsure” category. To investigate this issue, we also consider a 158 
multinomial logit specification, where outcomes are defined alternatively as “no”, “unsure”, 159 
and “yes”.  160 
Vaccine Uptake and the Size of Financial Incentives: It is possible, of course, that 161 
different sizes of conditional payments may induce higher (or lower) levels of uptake 162 
among respondents. This dose-response relationship is important to measure, given that 163 
a marginal change in the financial incentive can dramatically affect the cost of a mass 164 
incentive scheme. To assess the sensitivity of uptake response to different sizes of 165 
financial incentive, we re-estimate equation (1) disaggregated variable 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑉𝑉𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 into 166 
three incentive sub-categories: 𝛽𝛽1000,𝑖𝑖, 𝛽𝛽1500,𝑖𝑖, and 𝛽𝛽2000,𝑖𝑖. These sub-categories take value 167 
 
39 Alberto Abadie and Guido W Imbens. Large sample properties of matching estimators for average 
treatment effects. Econometrica, 74(1):235-267, 2006; Alberto Abadie and Guido W Imbens. Bias-corrected 
matching estimators for average treatment effects. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 29(1):1-11, 
2011. 
40 Alberto Abadie and Guido W Imbens. Matching on the estimated propensity score. Econometrica, 
84(2):781-807, 2016. 
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one for the specific incentive viewed by the respondent and are otherwise equal to zero. 168 
We formally test whether the size of the financial incentive affects vaccine uptake 169 
response by comparing model performance for an unconstrained model, in which 170 
incentive response is allowed to differ across incentive sub-categories, versus a model in 171 
which incentive responses are constrained to be identical across the incentive sub-172 
categories.41 173 
Financial Incentives and Sensitive Demographic Groups: Finally, even if vaccine 174 
incentives are successful among the general population, certain demographic groups 175 
may be unresponsive or may respond differently to incentives than the population at large. 176 
Particularly sensitive in this respect are Black Americans, who have historically been 177 
more mistrustful of vaccination, and some segments of the Republican party, who have 178 
been reluctant to engage in government-mandated public health measures, including 179 
social distancing and mask-wearing. We compare the incentive response for these two 180 
sensitive demographic groups versus those for the broader population.  181 
2.3. Summary Statistics 182 
Full data, including demographics, are posted at the Open Science Framework at 183 
https://osf.io/n9qra/. Summary statistics are reported in Table 1. In the no-incentive condition, 184 
which can be interpreted as the base rate, 58% of respondents said “yes” they were willing to 185 
take the vaccine, 24% said they were “unsure”, and 18% said “no”. These rates are similar to 186 
those found in other national surveys.42 As in prior polls, we found that Democrats were the most 187 
likely to indicate willingness to take the vaccine, with a 20-percentage-point increase over the 188 
 
41 Comparison of the constrained and unconstrained models is based on the Akaike information criterion 
(AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), where smaller levels of the information criteria indicate 
better model performance. 
42 See, e.g., Gallup (2021) at fn. 2; Murphy et a. (2021) at fn. 3. 
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base rate. Women were 11 percentage points less likely and Black Americans were 10 189 
percentage points less likely to take the vaccine overall, again reflecting known trends.  190 

















Table 1. Summary Statistics  
Variable Portion of Sample 
Overall Vaccine Uptake 0.64 
Incentive Scenario  
 No Incentive 0.24 
 Incentive 0.76 
   $1000 Incentive 0.25 
   $1500 Incentive 0.25 
   $2000 Incentive 0.26 
Age  
 18 to 29 0.39 
 30 to 49 0.23 
 50 to 64 0.17 
 ≥65 0.21 
Gender  
 Male 0.50 
 Female 0.49 
Household Income  
 $0 to $29,000 0.28 
 $30,000 to $59,000 0.22 
 $60,000 to $149,999 0.40 
 $150,000 or more 0.10 
Education Level  
 Less than High School 0.04 
 High School/GED 0.24 
 Some College (No Degree) 0.24 
 Associates Degree 0.11 
 Bachelors Degree 0.23 
 Graduate/Professional Degree 0.14 
Ethnicity   
 White 0.78 
 Black 0.14 
 Asian 0.04 
 Latino 0.08 
 Other 0.05 
Political Affiliation  
 Republican 0.29 
 Democrat 0.36 
  Independent 0.26 
















Table 2 reports our main results. Column (1) shows the impacts of financial incentives on 191 
vaccine uptake as estimated via ordinary least squares (OLS) (i.e., equation 1). Column 192 
(2) shows the results of Probit estimation, where reported coefficients are marginal 193 
effects. Columns (3) and (4), respectively, show the estimated average treatment effects 194 
(ATEs) obtained via nearest-neighbor matching43 and propensity score matching.44 195 
Referring to our variable of interest in Table 2, we see that coupled incentives 196 
increase estimated vaccination rates by 7 to 8 percentage points. The magnitude of this 197 
response is consistent across Columns (1) through (4), and in each specification, the 198 
response is statistically significant at the 95% level. Recall from Section 2.3 that average 199 
uptake among respondents in the no-incentive (i.e., control) group was 58%. Thus, 200 
coupled incentives would bring U.S. vaccination levels to more than 65%--substantially 201 
closer to the rates that experts say are needed to reach herd immunity. Figure 1(a) reports 202 
the results of the multinomial estimation with respect to our outcomes of interest. The 203 
results depicted here are the marginal effects evaluated at the unconditional mean of the 204 
sample. As shown in Figure 1, offering any incentive yielded an 8-percentage-point 205 
increase (statistically significant at the 95% level) in vaccine uptake (“yes”, compared to 206 
the base condition, when controlling for demographics. It also resulted in a 6-percentage-207 
point decrease (statistically significant at the 95% level) in those responding “no” and a 208 
smaller, nonsignificant decrease in those “unsure”. The softening of complete opposition 209 
may be important in coming months, as individuals gain more information about the safety 210 
of the vaccine and taking the vaccine becomes a social norm.  211 
 
43 See, supra, fn. 25. 
44 See, supra, fn. 26. 
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Table 2. Impacts of Financial Incentives on Vaccine Uptake   
     (1)   (2)   (3)  (4) 
Variables OLS Probit NNMatch PSMatch 
Incentive  0.0769**   0.0788**   0.0823**   0.0709**  
   (0.0343)   (0.0327)   (0.0361)   (0.0341) 
Age         
  30 to 49   -0.0827**   -0.0744*    
    (0.0403)   (0.0389)    
  50 to 64   -0.0764*   -0.0711*    
    (0.0463)   (0.0193)    
 ≥65  0.0168   0.0193    
    (0.0425)   (0.0436)    
Female  -0.1124***   -0.1106***    
    (0.0316)   (0.0301)    
Household Income       
  $30,000 to $59,999   -0.0505   -0.0518    
    (0.0445)   (0.0403)    
  $60,000 to $149,999   0.0451   0.0403    
    (0.0414)   (0.0394)    
  $150,000 or more   0.0813   0.0828    
    (0.0585)   (0.0626)    
Education Level       
  High School/GED   -0.0524   -0.0508    
    (0.0849)   (0.0776)    
  Some College (No Degree)   -0.0089   -0.0104    
    (0.0861)   (0.0792)    
  Associate Degree   -0.0099   -0.0118    
    (0.0917)   (0.0851)    
  Bachelor’s Degree   0.0508   0.0494    
    (0.0865)   (0.0809)    
  Graduate/Professional Degree   0.1393   0.1526*    
    (0.0890)   (0.0880)    
Ethnicity       
  Black   -0.1057**   -0.1041**    
    (0.0465)   (0.0427)    
  Asian   0.1216*   0.1236    
    (0.0664)   (0.0773)    
  Latino   0.0126   0.0091    
    (0.0576)   (0.0552)    
  Other (Non-White)   0.1438**   0.0091**    
    (0.0676)   (0.0750)    
Political Party       
  Republican   0.0442   0.0378    
    (0.0634)   (0.0569)    
  Democrat   0.2005***   0.1979***    
    (0.0609)   (0.05515)    
  Independent   0.0518   0.0448    
     (0.0637)   (0.0570)      
Observations  1,000   1,000   1,000  1,000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Figure 1: Multinomial Logit Model of Vaccine Uptake 
 
(a) Binary Incentive Model 
 
(b) Disaggregated Incentive Model 
Note: Figure reports the results of the multinomial estimation with respect to our outcomes of interest. 
Estimates are the marginal effects evaluated at the unconditional mean of the sample. Panel (a) of the 
Figure reports results for the model in which all incentive values are aggregated into a binary “incentive” 
versus “no incentive” condition. Panel (b) shows results for the model in which the different incentive values 
are disaggregated. 
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Does the size of the financial incentive matter in increasing uptake? Table 3 reports 212 
results of the analysis in which responses to financial incentives are dis-aggregated by 213 
payment size. Column (1) of the Table reports results of the specification in which all 214 
incentives are constrained to elicit an identical response. Column (2) reports estimates 215 
for the unconstrained model. 216 
Note that, by design, incentive response estimates in Column (1) of Table 3 are 217 
identical to those reported in Column (1) of Table 2. Under this specification, each of the 218 
three incentive payment levels induce a 7.7-percentage-point increase in vaccine uptake 219 
(statistically significant at the 95% confidence level). In the unconstrained model in 220 
Column (2) of Table 3, the $1,000 incentive generates a similar, 7.6-percentage-point 221 
increase in uptake (statistically significant at the 90% level). The point estimate for the 222 
$1,500 incentive elicits an 11.7-percentage-point increase in uptake and is statistically 223 
significant at the 99% confidence level. The estimated response to the $2,000 incentive 224 
is positive (4.1 percentage points) but statistically insignificant at conventional levels. 225 
These patterns could be the result of low statistical power, or it could be that higher levels 226 
of payment reduce demand for the vaccine compared to the lower incentive amounts.  227 
To determine whether the constrained model or the unconstrained model is 228 
preferable for the purposes of economic inference, we compare the AIC and BIC between 229 
the two models. As shown in Table 3, the constrained model—in which all incentive levels 230 
elicit an identical response—generates lower AIC and BIC scores than the unconstrained 231 
model, suggesting the constrained model is preferable. Moreover, using a post-estimation  232 
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Table 3: Vaccine Uptake and the Size of Financial Incentives 
     (1)   (2)  
Variables    Constrained   Unconstrained  
$1,000 Incentive  0.0769**   0.0761*  
    (0.0343)   (0.0411)  
$1,500 Incentive  0.0769**   0.1174***  
    (0.0343)   (0.0414)  
$2,000 Incentive  0.0769**   0.0399  
    (0.0343)   (0.0424)  
Age     
  30 to 49   -0.0827**   -0.0804**  
    (0.0403)   (0.0402)  
  50 to 64   -0.0764*   -0.0763  
    (0.0463)   (0.0466)  
 ≥65  0.0168   0.0160  
    (0.0425)   (0.0424)  
Female  -0.1124***   -0.1141***  
    (0.0316)   (0.0317)  
Household Income   
  $30,000 to $59,999   -0.0505   -0.0564  
    (0.0445)   (0.0445)  
  $60,000 to $149,999   0.0451   0.0420  
    (0.0414)   (0.0414)  
  $150,000 or more   0.0813   0.0819  
    (0.0585)   (0.0585)  
Education Level   
  High School/GED   -0.0524   -0.0473  
    (0.0849)   (0.0850)  
  Some College (No Degree)   -0.0089   -0.0086  
    (0.0861)   (0.0858)  
  Associates Degree   -0.0099   -0.0065  
    (0.0917)   (0.0915)  
  Bachelors Degree   0.0508   0.0551  
    (0.0865)   (0.0864)  
  Graduate/Professional Degree   0.1393   0.1422  
    (0.0890)   (0.0887)  
Ethnicity   
  Black   -0.1057**   -0.1043**  
    (0.0465)   (0.0462)  
  Asian   0.1216*   0.1291*  
    (0.0664)   (0.0663)  
  Latino   0.0126   0.0122  
    (0.0576)   (0.0573)  
  Other (Non-White)   0.1438**   0.1523**  
    (0.0676)   (0.0669)  
Political Party   
  Republican   0.0442   0.0477  
    (0.0634)   (0.0638)  
  Democrat   0.2005***   0.2015***  
    (0.0609)   (0.0611)  
  Independent   0.0518   0.0538  
     (0.0637)   (0.0639)  
AIC   1294.134   1294.480  
BIC    1397.197   1407.359  
Observations  1,000   1,000  
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Wald test on the unconstrained model, we also fail to reject the hypothesis that the 233 
incentives elicit an identical response. In other words, we do not observe any meaningful 234 
difference in the effectiveness of incentives among the three payment levels. We caution 235 
that the results of this analysis hold only for the range of incentives we have tested here. 236 
Obviously, outcomes may diverge for dramatically higher or lower incentive levels.  237 
Figure 1(b) above shows results for the multinomial logit model for which the 238 
different incentive values are disaggregated. These results are consistent with our 239 
indicator specification in Table 3. We fail to reject the hypothesis that the incentive 240 
response is identical across the different payments when we run the model 241 
disaggregating the three incentive conditions. 242 
Figure 2 compares the incentive responses for various demographic groups, 243 
including race/ethnicity, income, and political identities. While it bears emphasis that our 244 
statistical power is limited within subgroups, The average responses differ dramatically 245 
by demographic group. For Black Americans, 53% (±17%) of respondents in the no-246 
incentive (control) indicated they would choose to receive the vaccine. At lower levels of 247 
financial incentive ($1,000 and $1,500), Black respondents appear highly responsive. The 248 
$1,500 incentive increased vaccine uptake among Black respondents to 68% (±16%). 249 
This is a substantially higher response than the sample average, and approaches the 250 
estimated threshold needed to achieve herd immunity. However, for the $2,000 incentive, 251 
uptake among Black respondents falls dramatically to 39% (±15%). This is 13.6 252 
percentage points below vaccination rates among the control group.  We see a similar 253 
trend for Latino respondents, and indeed every racial/ethnic group has a non-linear trend 254 
on the size of the incentive.  255 
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Note:  Income quartiles are (1) <$30,000, (2) $30,000 to $59,999, (3) $60,000 to $149,999, and (4) $150,000 or more. 260 
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For income, we see generally lower incomes associated with lower vaccine uptake.  261 
The middle-income groups appear most responsive to the incentive. One might 262 
hypothesize that the lowest-income respondents would have the greatest response to the 263 
incentive, perhaps overriding their autonomous choices about whether to get the vaccine. 264 
That hypothesis is not supported by the  patterns in the estimated effects by income 265 
group.   266 
Republicans were less responsive to financial incentives than the general 267 
population. Referring to Figure 2, 59% (±11%) of Republican respondents in the no-268 
incentive group. Only 58% (±12%) of those who viewed the $1,000 incentive indicated 269 
they would elect for vaccination. Similarly, 63% (±11%) and 61% (±10%) of respondents, 270 
respectively, elected for vaccination under the $1,500 and $2,000 conditions.  271 
Interestingly, although independents showed the lowest vaccine uptake at baseline, they 272 
showed the most substantial response to the financial incentives.  Democrats were both 273 
more receptive to the vaccine at baseline and were also responsive to the financial 274 
incentive.  Again, across these groups, the $2000 incentive appears to be unhelpful 275 
compared to the more moderate sized incentives.  We emphasize again that statistical 276 
power is limited for all these subgroup analyses. 277 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
Widespread hesitance toward COVID-19 vaccines has the potential to create a gap 278 
between the actual vaccination rate and the rate  needed to achieve herd immunity. This 279 
research investigates the extent to which coupled financial incentives (conditional cash 280 
transfers) would help bridge this gap. We find that financial incentives between $1000 281 
and $2000 to receive the vaccine yields an 8-percentage-point increase in uptake relative 282 
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to baseline. The size of the cash transfer in this range does not dramatically affect uptake 283 
rates. However, incentive responses differ dramatically by demographic group. 284 
Republicans were less responsive to financial incentives than the general population. For 285 
Black and Latino Americans especially, very large financial incentives appear to be 286 
counter-productive.  287 
We caution that, as an online survey experiment, our study has limitations. Our 288 
sample was constructed to be representative of the United States adult population on 289 
certain demographics, but excludes adults outside the United States.  Even within the 290 
United States the sample may exclude some populations, such as those lacking internet 291 
access.  292 
We measured self-reported vaccine intentions at one point in time, not actual 293 
behaviors in the future. We expect the overall willingness to take the vaccine to change 294 
over time, but the marginal effects of incentive may remain more constant.  295 
Survey responses are subject to biases, including social desirability, but the 296 
anonymous between-subject design helps. And, it is not clear that such biases would 297 
interact with and confound our manipulations.  298 
We tested a relatively large range of incentives, but further research could explore 299 
lower or higher payments, as well as explore framing effects and baseline effects.45 300 
People may respond differently to receiving a conditional cash transfer (as in our 301 
experiment) or refundable tax credit for getting vaccinated versus a fine or civil penalty 302 
for not getting vaccinated, even if the economic impact is the same. Another frame is the 303 
 
45 Ivo Vlaev, Dominic King, Ara Darzi, and Paul Dolan. "Changing health behaviors using financial 
incentives: a review from behavioral economics." BMC public health 19, no. 1 (2019): 1-9. 
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mere compensation for the time and inconvenience of getting the vaccine (reducing 304 
hassle costs to net zero), which some employers are reportedly using.46 305 
Although we examined demographic covariates, our sample was limited to explore 306 
subgroup effects.  We also did not measure other attitudes or beliefs, which could 307 
moderate the observed outcomes.  Our study cannot say whether the offer of payment 308 
changes beliefs about the vaccine’s safety or efficacy, for example.  309 
Increasing vaccination rates through incentives faces implementation challenges. 310 
For example, policy designers will have to decide whether to pay those who have medical 311 
vaccine contraindications and whether to retroactively pay those who were vaccinated 312 
prior to the incentive being announced, two actions that may make the policy more 313 
politically popular but  could reduce the marginal effectiveness of the incentive in 314 
changing behavior. Moreover, in the United States, the current mechanism to confirm 315 
vaccination, a paper card provided by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control, is not robust 316 
against fraud. A digital passport would be valuable for many purposes beyond financial 317 
incentives, including conditional mandates (e.g., around workplaces and airline travel).47 318 
In any initiative to increase vaccination rates,  it is also important that all Americans have 319 
fair access to the vaccine. Thus incentives should track intended behaviors (vaccination) 320 
rather than structural inequities (such as disparate access to the vaccine). 321 
We have not calculated the cost-effectiveness of vaccine incentives, and thus 322 
cannot say whether it would be a “prudent investment,” a point that some commentators 323 
 
46 See, supra, Miller (2021) at fn. 10. 
47 Alexandra L Phelan. Covid-19 immunity passports and vaccination certificates: scientific, equitable, and 
legal challenges. The Lancet, 395(10237):1595-1598, 2020; Christopher T Robertson. Vaccines and airline 
travel: A federal role to protect the public health. American journal of law & medicine, 42(2-3):543-571, 
2016. 
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have called into doubt.48  If the U.S. government implemented the vaccine incentive as 324 
part of a broader stimulus plan, by simply making some payment that it would otherwise 325 
make (or a tax relief that it would otherwise provide) conditional on getting the vaccine, 326 
then the budgetary impact could be zero or actually negative (if some people still decline 327 
the vaccine-plus-incentive). Still, those who decline to be vaccinated could be helped in 328 
other ways, to minimize the welfare losses associated with the pandemic and to 329 
compensate for other pro-social behaviors.49 330 
Our purpose is not to provide a full-throated ethical and policy defense, or even a 331 
comprehensive analysis, of incentives for COVID-19 vaccination.  Yet, we can address 332 
some normative concerns that have been raised in the literature (and by reviewers). 333 
 Some have argued that financial incentives for vaccination would be 334 
“paternalistic.”50  Dworkin defines that term as “the interference of a state or an individual 335 
with another person, against their will, and defended or motivated by a claim that the 336 
person interfered with will be better off or protected from harm.”51  The concept seems 337 
inapposite for vaccine incentives for at least two reasons.  First, an offer of money to 338 
persons is not an “interference … against their will” – they are free to take it or leave it.  339 
Still, without waging into a semantic debate, one might call incentives a form of 340 
“asymmetric” or “soft” paternalism, depending on the giver’s motivation.52  Regardless of 341 
 
48 Emily A. Largent and Franklin G. Miller, Problems with paying people to be vaccinated against COVID-
19. JAMA 325, no. 6 (2021): 534-535; Ana Santos Rutschman and Timothy L. Wiemken, The Case 
Against Monetary Behavioral Incentives in the Context of COVID-19 Vaccination, Harvard Public Health 
Review, 2020.   
49 See, supra, Robertson et. al (2020) at fn. 11.  
50 Rutschman and Wiemken supra note 48. 
51 Gerald Dworkin, "Paternalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward 
N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/paternalism/>. 
52 See George Loewenstein, Troyen Brennan, and Kevin G. Volpp. Asymmetric paternalism to improve 
health behaviors. Jama 298, no. 20 (2007): 2415-2417 (‘the guiding principle of asymmetric paternalism 
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the label, incentives respect individual choices.  Indeed, our data are inconsistent with the 342 
claim that incentives would “reinforce paternalism towards racial minorities and 343 
economically disadvantaged individuals.” In our data, approximately half of individuals  344 
indicated that they would exercise their will to decline the vaccine (Figure 2). 345 
Further, the primary purpose of encouraging vaccination is not to promote the 346 
welfare of the individual recipient, like say a motorcycle helmet law. The goal is to provide 347 
a public good – population-level herd immunity.53  Putting the point differently, being 348 
unvaccinated is the textbook example of imposing a negative externality risk of infection 349 
on other persons.54 One could imagine tort law trying to internalize the costs of precaution 350 
by imposing liability, but in practice it would be infeasible for dead plaintiffs to sue, it would 351 
be hard to show specific causation, and many potential defendants are judgment-proof 352 
and uninsured for these liabilities.  Thus, a prospective regulatory or incentives-based 353 
approach is more sensible.  354 
More generally, one might worry that large payments would be irresistible (an 355 
“undue influence” or “unjust inducement”) to those of limited means, making it nearly 356 
impossible for them to form autonomous choices about vaccination.55 This concern is 357 
 
is that institutions and incentives should be structured and aligned in such a way to maximize the 
likelihood that individuals will engage in behaviors that are beneficial, making those who would otherwise 
engage in unhealthy behaviors better off without adverse consequences to other”). 
53 Jonny Anomaly, Public health and public goods. Public Health Ethics 4, no. 3 (2011): 251-259. 
54 Joseph Stiglitz, Economics of The Public Sector, p120 (1988)(“One of the methods by which the 
incidence of some diseases is reduced is through vaccination. Those who are vaccinated incur some cost 
(discomfort, time, money, risk of getting the disease from a bad batch of the vaccine). They receive some 
private benefit through a reduced risk of getting the disease, but a major part of the benefit is public, the 
reduced incidence of the disease in the community from which all benefit. In many cases the private costs 
exceed the private benefits, but the social benefits - including a reduced incidence of the disease - far 
exceed the costs. Because of the free rider problem, governments frequently require that individuals 
become vaccinated.”) 
55 See Scott D. Halpern, Jason HT Karlawish, David Casarett, Jesse A. Berlin, and David A. Asch. 
"Empirical assessment of whether moderate payments are undue or unjust inducements for participation 
in clinical trials." Archives of Internal Medicine 164, no. 7 (2004): 801-803. 












April 28, 2021 
27 
 
also sometimes inaptly called ‘coercion’ by bioethicists.56  Our data does not support 358 
these concerns.  If money functioned like a light attracting unthinking moths at night, then 359 
one might expect the largest money offers to induce the greatest response, and for the 360 
ultimate uptake to approach 100%.  Those expectations are not supported by our data. 361 
Instead, respondents appear to be  capable of weighing other factors autonomously.  362 
Moreover, this concern about money being irresistible would seem to be of 363 
greatest concern for those of lowest income, but we do not observe greater response to 364 
the incentive for this group (Figure 2).  On the other hand, this lack of uptake suggests 365 
that, if implemented in the real world, the incentives may be disproportionately paid to 366 
higher-earning people who are more likely to opt for the vaccine, making the transfers 367 
regressive overall.  Nonetheless, even lower-income respondents benefit from herd 368 
immunity.  If they value being non-vaccinated more than the cash payment, but 369 
nonetheless enjoy the herd immunity results in their communities, then they may be best 370 
off overall.  This same analysis may suggest that a vaccine mandate would be 371 
disproportionately coercive on lower-income people who have stronger preferences 372 
against vaccination. 373 
Nonetheless, in a world of scarcity with a weak social safety net, people are often 374 
called upon to make difficult choices, using their bodies to perform dangerous jobs, for 375 
 
56 Joseph Millum and Michael Garnett. How payment for research participation can be coercive. The 
American Journal of Bioethics, 19(9):21_31, 2019; Wertheimer  A, Miller  FG.  Payment for research 
participation: a coercive offer?   J Med Ethics. 2008;34(5):389-392. doi:10.1136/jme.2007.021857; Emily A 
Largent and Holly Fernandez Lynch. Paying research participants: regulatory uncertainty, conceptual 
confusion, and a path forward. Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law and Ethics, 17(1):61, 2017. 
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example. Desperation is arguably best addressed by building a stronger safety net, rather 376 
than canceling compensation for pro-social behaviors.  377 
Ultimately, our data suggests that financial incentives should be on the table for 378 
policymakers. They can be used in conjunction with optimal distribution logistics to ensure 379 
that the vaccine reaches all the people who want it and optimal messaging to dispel 380 
misinformation and to maximize desire for the vaccine.  Before incentives larger than 381 
$1500 are implemented, further research should explore whether there is in fact a non-382 
linear dose-response effect, as suggested by our data.  Other approaches should be 383 
explored for Republicans altogether.  In sum, a well-tailored incentive may help boost 384 
vaccination uptake to levels needed to reach herd-immunity.   385 
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3798702
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